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Divorcing Marriage from Procreation
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Public debate about same-sex marriage has spectacularly intensified in
the wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.1 But amid the twisted faces,
shouts, and murmurs surrounding that decision, a bit of old-fashioned
common-lawmaking has been lost. Some have criticized the Goodridge
court for its apparently result-oriented approach to the question of whether,
consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the commonwealth may
deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.2 Others have defended the
decision, both on the court's own rational basis terms and on other grounds,
including sex discrimination and substantive due process. 3 This Comment
contends that both sides are partly right.
I join those commentators who find Goodridge's reasoning flawed but
its outcome correct.4 Where I part ways is in recognizing the vital
importance but untapped potential of the Supreme Court's decision in
Turner v. Safley.5 The Turner Court held unconstitutional a Missouri prison
regulation denying inmates the right to marry except for "compelling
reasons." 6 It is a familiar case, frequently invoked in legal arguments over
same-sex marriage to support the proposition that marriage is a fundamental
1. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Recent Case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 2441 (2004); Douglas W. Kmiec & Mark S. Scarberry, Massachusetts
Alternatives, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 11, 2004, http://nationalreview.com/comment/
kmiec scarberry200402110925.asp.
3. See, e.g., Sarah Carlson-Wallrath, Why the Civil Institution of Marriage Must Be Extended
to Same-Sex Couples, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 73 (2004); John G. Cuihane, The
Heterosexual Agenda, 13 WIDENER L.J. 759 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 945, 985-86 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal: Massachusetts Gets It Wrong
on Gay Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 19.
5. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
6. Id. at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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right under our federal constitutional jurisprudence.7 Too often, however,
these arguments miss the totality of what Turner tells us about exactly why
marriage is a fundamental right. Because the Turner Court struck down a
marriage ban that applied to a population with no legal right to procreate
and that provided an exception for pregnancy, the decision undermines any
claim that marriage is fundamental because of an inexorable connection to
procreation.
Part I of this Comment scrutinizes and ultimately rejects the Goodridge
court's rational basis analysis. Part II explores the road not taken in
Goodridge-the fundamental rights approach of cases such as Loving v.
Virginia,8 Zablocki v. Redhail,9 and Turner. I argue that for marriage to
comport with our fundamental rights jurisprudence, the source of its
constitutional definition must be constitutional common law, not individual
state statutes. Part III rediscovers Turner as a source of that constitutional
definition, concluding that the case is irreconcilable with the view that the
possibility of procreation is a necessary affluent of marriage's
findamentality. With Bowers v. Hardwickl° officially dead, Turner insists
that same-sex marriage bans answer to strict, and therefore fatal, scrutiny.
I
Although the Goodridge court decided the case under the
Massachusetts Constitution, the reasoning invoked under that document
parallels that of its federal counterpart: Each jurisprudence applies
heightened scrutiny to statutes that draw a suspect classification or
implicate a fundamental right and applies rational basis review to all other
statutes." Because the Goodridge court determined that the Massachusetts
marriage-licensing statute did not satisfy rational basis review, it did not
have to reach the question of whether and how to apply heightened
scrutiny.12 In her rational basis review, Chief Justice Marshall considered
three asserted rationales for the commonwealth's prohibition on same-sex
marriage: first, that it "provid[es] a favorable setting for procreation";
second, that it "ensur[es] the optimal setting for child rearing"; and third,
7. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); see also Standhardt v.
Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the
Fundamental Right To Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1200 (2004).
8. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
10. 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-49, 960.
12. Id. at 961. Chief Justice Marshall may have had her reasons for sidestepping strict
scrutiny. For example, relying on Turner to decide Goodridge on federal constitutional grounds
would have raised the possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review. See generally DANIEL R.
PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 105-17 (2003) (making an empirical argument that
federal courts are systematically more hostile than state courts to gay rights claims).
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that it "preserv[es] scarce State and private financial resources."' 13 The ban
on same-sex marriage need be rationally related to only one of these goals
to survive review under the deferential rational basis standard.
We need go no further than the first. Marshall rehearsed familiar
arguments for why, if a stable procreative setting is the goal, same-sex
marriage bans are both over- and underinclusive. Many same-sex couples
are permitted and even encouraged to adopt or conceive through artificial
insemination and subsequently raise children, Marshall argued, while many
opposite-sex couples freely marry without any desire or even ability to
procreate. 14 Attempting to ground the right to marry in procreation thus
smells suspiciously post hoc. But rational basis review is hardly so
searching. Consider an analogy: Are laws that restrict unemployment
benefits to people who lose their jobs rationally related to the goal of
ensuring that people who are laid off have soft landings? Like traditional
marriage laws, unemployment benefits are both over- and underinclusive.
Many individuals who receive unemployment benefits do not need them,
while many who are employed desperately need a financial cushion. Yet
unemployment benefits programs would easily survive rational basis
review, which permits the use of the roughest of proxies. Just as the state
may draw the line at "unemployment" in a social welfare program, it may
draw the line at "opposite sex" in the enjoyment of the marriage benefits
that it confers as a civil entitlement. 15 If same-sex marriage bans are to fail,
they must fail under heightened scrutiny.16
II
Those in sympathy with the Goodridge result might instead rely on a
far stronger federal constitutional argument.17 Loving v. Virginia, which
13. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 961-62.
15. It is not obvious how allowing same-sex couples to marry hinders the goal of providing a
favorable setting for procreation. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA,
2004 WL 1738447, at * 10 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004). Neither is it obvious, however, how
allowing employed persons to receive unemployment insurance would hinder the government in
assisting the unemployed. See generally Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61,
69-70 (1913) ("The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.").
16. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("The fact
that the line [defining marriage] could be drawn differently is a matter for legislative, rather than
judicial, consideration, as long as plausible reasons exist for placement of the current line."
(emphasis added)); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (defending
Indiana's same-sex marriage prohibition by arguing that "[tihere was a rational basis for the
legislature to draw the line between opposite-sex couples, who as a generic group are biologically
capable of reproducing, and same-sex couples, who are not").
17. Justice Greaney, concurring in Goodridge, took up the heightened scrutiny challenge by
arguing that the marriage statutes discriminated on the basis of sex. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
970-74 (Greaney, J., concurring). This argument garnered a majority in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993), which temporarily struck down Hawaii's civil marriage law, but it is
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held Virginia's antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, was decided on
two independent and equally adequate grounds.18 The first was the Equal
Protection Clause: The racial classification at issue could not be justified by
any state interest other than white supremacy, which was hardly legitimate,
much less compelling. The second was that the freedom to marry is
"fundamental," among the "vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men" that the "substantive" component of the
Due Process Clause protects against government infringement. 19 Eleven
years after Loving, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court confirmed that state
impediments to marriage are subject to strict scrutiny because the right is
"of fundamental importance for all individuals., 20 If strict scrutiny does
attend prohibitions on same-sex marriage, this argument goes, their
unconstitutionality is settled.2'
The counterargument is that the right to marry, though fundamental,
does not contemplate the right to marry members of one's own sex.22 That
is, same-sex marriage is not "marriage" in any constitutionally relevant
sense. A ban on same-sex marriage thus does not encroach on any
fundamental right and, correspondingly, does not trigger strict scrutiny.
It has become popular to state without elaboration that legislatures, not
judges, define marriage. 3 But if this is so, then marriage is an odd
constitutionally awkward. Though obviously invoking a sex-based classification, the
Massachusetts marriage laws just as obviously treated the two sexes identically. See Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d at 991 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999)
("The test to evaluate whether a facially gender-neutral statute discriminates on the basis of sex is
whether the law 'can be traced to a [sex] discriminatory purpose."' (quoting Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979))). Thus, the argument forces us to consider whether sex
classifications that concededly visit disfavor upon neither sex are presumptively unconstitutional.
This cannot be so. Because any statute that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation
necessarily recognizes differences between sexes, Greaney's approach elevates sexual orientation
to a suspect classification. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Supreme Judicial Court has been
willing to take this step. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declining to apply
heightened scrutiny to a Colorado constitutional amendment forbidding antidiscrimination laws
from protecting gays). Although it has been argued that tiers-of-scrutiny analysis is dying a quiet
death at the hands of gay rights cases, see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1447 (2004), an argument from doctrine that the distinction between sex discrimination and
sexual orientation discrimination is constitutionally irrelevant would be a stretch, see Lofion v.
Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (employing
rational basis review in upholding Florida's prohibition on adoption by same-sex couples), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right
To Marry, 1790-1990, 41 How. L.J. 289, 304 (1998) ("The brief discussion of the freedom to
marry in Loving .... is legally binding, not mere dicta.").
19. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
20. 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
21. See Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004, 2005 WL 363778, at *14-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 4, 2005) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down New York's prohibition on same-sex
marriage).
22. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995); Lewis v. Harris,
No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *4-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003).
23. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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fundamental right.24 The jurisprudential purpose of calling a right
"fundamental" is to remove it from the vagaries of the ordinary political
process.25 In Loving, the Virginia legislature was conspicuously denied the
opportunity to supply its own definition of marriage. In Zablocki, the State
of Wisconsin was not permitted to "define" marriage as being restricted to
those without outstanding child support obligations.26 The doctrinal
question of whether same-sex marriage is "marriage" is not for legislatures
or interest groups, but rather for those constitutionally charged with
defining the scope of fundamental rights.27
Some will object that the definition of marriage as the union of a man
and a woman is no mere statutory drafting trick, but rather instantiates a
dominant historical understanding that accords with marriage's role as an
engine of civilization. The state's interest in marriage stems from a
transcendent interest in cultural continuity and extends beyond any
individual's particular relationship.28 The effect of labeling marriage a
fundamental right, however, is to transfer presumptive protection from the
community's to the individual's side of the constitutional ledger. While the
state is free to assert a range of communitarian interests in attempting to
justify a ban on same-sex marriage, these interests do not in themselves
inform the question of whether marriage is fundamental. For the purposes
of strict scrutiny analysis, that is, the definition of marriage must answer not
merely to popular convention but to what our common law constitutional
tradition regards as fundamental about the institution.
To answer the crucial question of why marriage is fundamental under
the Court's jurisprudence, we must look to the Court's own words. If its
definition of marriage stands independent of any connection either to
procreation or to some other feature of marriage that excludes same-sex
couples, a naked assertion that there is no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage remains conclusory.
24. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 27, 32
(1996).
25. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting a
tension between declaring a constitutional "right to marry" and leaving its definition to state
legislatures).
26. Id. at 383-91 (majority opinion).
27. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
28. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing "preserving the traditional institution of marriage" as a legitimate state interest);
David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S.
TEX. L. REv. 1, 29 (1997) (describing marriage as "a unique community defined by sexual
complementarity").
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III
The Supreme Court has offered numerous explanations for the
fundamentality of marriage, none of which establishes procreation as a
necessary or even important element. Proponents of same-sex marriage
prohibitions point to Skinner v. Oklahoma, in which the Court wrote that
"marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.",29 As a strict interpretive matter, the conjunctive
construction used in this passage suggests independence, not confluence,
between marriage and procreation. In any event, Skinner invalidated an
Oklahoma compulsory-sterilization statute, and so its discussion of
marriage was incidental to its discussion of the importance of procreation.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court revisited the rationale behind the
fundamentality of marriage and seemed to settle on a form of associative
freedom.30 Marriage, Justice Douglas wrote, "is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 31
Griswold fails to establish decisively, however, whether values like
"bilateral loyalty" are not merely important but are in fact sufficient to
confer fundamental status upon marriage. This is Turner's contribution.
Under the Missouri prison regulation challenged in Turner, an inmate could
marry "only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison," with
approval to be given only "when there are compelling reasons to do so."
32
Crucially for our purposes, "generally only pregnancy or birth of a child
[was] considered a 'compelling reason' to approve a marriage., 33 Turner
thus permits a test of the hypothesis that some biological nexus is a
necessary part of the constitutional definition of marriage. Procreation
involves, potentially, three elements: conception, pregnancy, and childbirth.
The "conception" variable was eliminated by the restrictions of prison life;
the regulation further isolated the "pregnancy" and "childbirth" variables. If
prisoners who can neither conceive nor become parents still have a
fundamental right to marry, then the fundamental right must attach to
features of the institution of marriage that are unrelated to procreation.
The Court so held. Even applying the deferential standard of review
typically afforded to prison regulations,34 the Court reiterated that marriage
29. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
30. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
31. Id.
32. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 96-97.
34. See id. at 90-91 (asking whether the regulation was reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1994 [Vol. 114:1989
Divorcing Marriage from Procreation
is a fundamental right, 35 which the Missouri regulation "impermissibly
burden[ed]. '36 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor wrote,
Many important attributes of marriage remain .. after taking into
account the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate
marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and
public commitment. . . In addition, many religions recognize
marriage as having spiritual significance .... Third, most inmates
eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore
most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they
ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital status often
is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits ....
property rights... , and other, less tangible benefits .... 37
In short, marriage is fundamental for many reasons, none of which is
tantamount to procreation nor to any other factor potentially absent in a
same-sex marriage. "Taken together," O'Connor wrote, "we conclude that
these remaining elements are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected
marital relationship in the prison context.
' 38
The burden for same-sex marriage opponents is to articulate how, from
the individual's perspective, these remaining elements apply with any less
force to gay Americans than to imprisoned ones. Same-sex marriages are no
less expressions of emotional support or public commitment than opposite-
sex marriages. (Given the social stigma attached to coming out, they are
arguably more so.) Although many religions do not recognize same-sex
marriage, many others do, and marriage may nonetheless have substantial
spiritual significance for same-sex couples. 39 Same-sex couples, like
opposite-sex couples, usually marry in the expectation that the marriage
will be consummated. 40 And same-sex couples, if permitted to marry,
would presumably qualify for attendant government benefits.
35. Id. at 95.
36. Id. at 97.
37. Id. at 95-96.
38. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
39. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 193 app. (1996) (collecting letters in support of
same-sex marriage from a wide range of religious leaders).
40. Writing in dissent in Goodridge, Justice Cordy suggested that the words "will be fully
consummated" are evidence that the possibility of procreation is "essential to the Supreme Court's
denomination of the right to marry as fundamental." Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting). Consummation of a marriage ordinarily refers to sexual relations or cohabitation,
however, not to procreation. See, e.g., Conner ex rel. Curry v. Schweiker, No. CS1-281A, 1981
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18399, at *5-6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 1981) ("A marriage is consummated
according to law when the parties co-habitate and hold themselves out as husband and
wife...."); see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 242 (9th ed. 1981) (defining
"consummate" as "to make (marital union) complete by sexual intercourse"); Laurence Drew
Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089,
1109 (2002) (noting that impotence as a ground for divorce does not typically encompass "those
who have the capacity to copulate but are infertile").
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Now recall the three interests that the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health asserted as justifying its prohibition on same-sex marriage:
that the ban provided a favorable setting for procreation, ensured an optimal
setting for child rearing, and preserved scarce state and private financial
resources. 41 That none of these interests satisfies strict scrutiny requires
little elaboration. Familiar principles of constitutional fit instruct us that
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying is hardly narrowly tailored to
an interest in providing either a favorable setting for procreation or an
optimal setting for child rearing. As for preserving financial resources, this
interest does not speak to why same-sex couples may be singled out. As
Judge Ferren wrote of Justice O'Connor's list in his dissent in Dean v.
District of Columbia, "If these attributes of marriage are relevant to the
needs and aspirations of gays and lesbians . ..we have the basis for
inquiring whether a marriage statute that excludes homosexuals from the
right to marry one another meets equal protection requirements. 42
IV
Common law constitutionalism is most fundamentally an exercise in
analogical reasoning. Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars interrogate and
impeach doctrine by demonstrating inconsistencies across the spectrum of
constitutional experience. Controlled experiments, the weapon of choice for
practitioners and academics in other fields, can be a powerful tool in legal
argument as well. This Comment has argued that Turner is an
underappreciated opportunity for controlled experiment in same-sex
marriage cases. The Turner Court had to evaluate whether prisoners-
prisoners!-with no procreative justification still have a fundamental right
to marry, and it held unanimously that they do. The case demonstrates,
therefore, that marriage is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution not
because it provides a setting for heterosexual procreation but because it
solemnizes a social relationship that individuals regard as fundamentally
important. Employing Turner for this proposition might have added the
legitimacy of doctrinal argument to Goodridge's revolutionary outcome.
-Jamal Greene
41. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42. 653 A.2d 307, 336 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Ferren's opinion comes as close as any to recognizing Turner's doctrinal potential. William
Eskridge, who argued Dean, is the most prominent of several academic voices in favor of a broad
reading of Turner, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 129, though the continuing validity of Bowers
v. Hardwick had, until recently, complicated his position considerably, see id. at 134-37.
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